Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials.
Introduction
May 20, 2005 , saw the first ever international clinical trials day, underlining the importance of clinical trials to medical research. 1 Since they provide the most reliable way to test the efficacy and safety of medical treatments, randomized controlled clinical trials constitute one of the main tools of scientific medicine. Without trials, ineffective treatments or, even worse, harmful interventions may be accepted in medical practice. Accordingly, the appropriate design of the incentives to conduct clinical research is considered to be of enormous importance as the following quote from the medical literature shows: "Randomised trials conducted over the past half century have helped to bring about a situation in which health care has been credited with three of the seven years of increased life expectancy over that time and an average of five additional years of partial or complete relief from the poor quality of life associated with chronic disease" (Chalmers (1998) ).
Recently, however, there have been a number of highly publicized cases in which pharmaceutical firms have selectively disclosed evidence on marketed drugs (see e.g. Curfman et al. (2005) , Harris and Koli (2005), Avorn (2006) , Harris (2007) , or Berenson (2007) ). 2 These scandals have generated a controversial debate about the appropriate design of a vigorous research enterprise that brings innovations to patients as quickly as possible. The consent that the parties associated in clinical trials-patients, doctors, researchers, medical journal editors, pharmaceutical industry, funders and government-have reached is that greater transparency in clinical trials is needed. 3 To achieve this transparency there are mainly two policy proposals discussed: clinical trial registries and clinical trial results databases. 4 A clinical trial registry contains information on ongoing clinical studies. As a result of the growing 1 Since 2005 the international clinical trials day has been celebrated yearly on or near the 20th of May. The event is promoted by the European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network. 2 The problem of selective publication of clinical trial results has already been recognized long ago and almost twenty years ago the first voices were raised demanding to require registration of all clinical trials prior to initiation (Simes (1986) ). 3 The medical literature discusses a second source of selective reporting. This is the so-called publication bias. It refers to the fact that for peer-reviewed journals negative and inconclusive trials are much less interesting than positive trials. Consequently, they are less likely to be published (See e.g. De Angelis et al. (2004) ). 4 Another measure discussed to solve the problem of selective reporting are reporting requirements about a sponsor's role in clinical studies. Starting point is the so-called problem of conflict of interest. As a result of an increase in the costs of clinical trials the pharmaceutical industry has increased its influence on the design, conduct and result reporting of clinical trials (for example through so-called contract research organizations). If the firm's influence is very strong, then "the results of the finished trial may be buried rather than published if they are unfavorable to the sponsor's product" (Davidoff (2001) , p. 825). See e.g. Krimsky (1999) , Sismondo (2008) , and the references in Davidoff (2001) for evidence about the existence of this problem. The present paper makes the benchmark assumption that the firm's interests completely determine results reporting.
support for registries, several voluntary registries have been created by, for example, public health authorities and the pharmaceutical industry. 5 However, given the limited success of these voluntary registries in solving the problem of selective reporting of clinical trials, policy proposals promote now the idea of a compulsory registry of all clinical trials. Recently, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors promoted a compulsory registry by requiring registration of clinical trials as a condition of their subsequent consideration for publication. 6 This effort is complemented by the definition of a minimum trial registration dataset by the World Health Organization aimed at standardizing the way information is made available to the public (see e.g. Gulmezoglu et al. (2005) ).
There are attempts to create additional incentives for registering by, for example, urging institutional review boards (of e.g. universities or hospitals) to consider registration of clinical trials a condition for approval. Also, around the world, governments are beginning to legislate mandatory disclosure of all trials. Thus, there is a tendency to create a de facto compulsory registry of clinical trials.
A clinical trial results database contains (a summary of) the results of completed clinical studies, regardless of outcome. As a result of the scandals caused through selective publication of trial results even the pharmaceutical industry acknowledges that there is a problem and (at least a part of) the pharmaceutical industry is supporting the creation of results databases. 7 Databases are often proposed in combination with a compulsory trial registry. For example, on September 27, 2007, President Bush signed into law The Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act, which contains mandatory registration and results reporting requirements (Drazen (2007) ). 8 5 See the account in Horton and Smith (1999) . 6 The disclosure refers to public registration of summary protocols at the initiation of all trials whose primary purpose is to affect clinical practice (phase III trials). Trials to assess major unknown toxicity or determine pharmacokinetics (phase I trials) are excluded. Trials between these two extremes (phase II trials) are decided on a case-by-case basis, see
De Angelis et al. (2004 and . 7 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufac- oSmithKline has created a results database and commits to disclose trial summaries "whether or not the data may be judged as positive or negative for its products" (Rockhold and Krall (2006) ). 8 The signing into law of this act does not imply that the discussion about the design of regulation is settled. On the one hand, in the U.S. the act must be followed by rule making and the environment in which clinical trials take place is mainly shaped by other legislation. The U.S. Congress, for instance, is currently considering The Fair Access to This paper aims at contributing to the debate about the appropriate design of the incentives to conduct medical research by providing a formal analysis of clinical trial registries and research databases. Given that the scandals mentioned before have been caused by selective reporting of evidence on marketed drugs, the main focus of the present paper is on postmarketing studies. 9 This is the fastest-growing area of clinical research today. One reason for this is that trials before access to the market leave residual but important uncertainty. This uncertainty is accepted at the time of distribution and once the drug is in the market it is agreed that potential adverse events should be monitored through postmarketing clinical trials (Pouvourville (2006) ). 10 Notice that not all postmarketing studies are required by the FDA at the time of approval of a new drug (see Glasser et al. (2007) ). 11 For instance, postmarketing studies are also conducted upon approval of a new drug in order to study the compound for potential use for other medical conditions.
In a nutshell, our analysis starts from the fact that clinical trials constitute an investment in information by pharmaceutical firms. Registries and databases affect the return on this investment by restricting the way in which drug companies transmit knowledge to medical decision-makers. They are, therefore, likely to affect the firm's investment in information, that is, the decision whether or not to conduct clinical trials.
From a strategic point of view-once a clinical trial has been carried out-the scope of pharmaceutical firms is limited. Firms can hold back information about unfavorable trials but they cannot lie and forge the entire evidence in a clinical trial in their favour. 12 Holding back trial results considered 'negative'
Clinical Trials Act which is an amendment to the Public Health Service Act. On the other hand, in other parts of the world similar rules are discussed. For instance, several European countries have established disclosure rules in the form of registries or results databases, while others are discussing such rules. 9 To the extent that the monotonicity assumption (which we state below) holds for the relevant parameter range, our analysis also applies to approval trials for new drugs and to approval trials for new indications of already existing drugs. 10 At an annual growth rate of 23%, industry investment in postmarketing research is expected to top $12 billion in 2007 (Research and Markets (2007) ). According to a study from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, between 1998 and 2003 the FDA requested postmarketing commitment studies in 73% of the approvals for new drugs (Tufts CSDD (2004) ). Other incentives to conduct postmarketing studies may come from the widespread adoption of drug formularies. Pharmaceutical firms face strong pressure to provide clinical and economic data that justify their inclusion in the formulary (Folland et al. (2004) ). 11 The so-called postmarketing commitments (PMC) are negotiated with the sponsor. Concerning these trials our model would predict that registries and databases affect the bargaining position of the sponsor. Moreover, the firm retains the power to design the trial and to determine whether the safety of a drug is fully explored (Vlahakes (2006) ).
Postmarketing study designs include also designs different from clinical trials. Given the simple model of clinical trials in the present paper, we believe that it can also be applied to much of this postmarketing research. 12 While we assume that pharmaceutical firms cannot forge the entire evidence in a clinical trial, we acknowledge that there is evidence that the results of a trial might be manipulated. For instance, results might be presented in such a form that the trial appears to be more positive than it really is (see e.g. Chan et al (2004) . See also Dickersin (2008) for an extensive review of the problems associated to the reporting of trial results. We are grateful to a referee for pointing is the so-called problem of selective disclosure of trial results which has generated the debate about reform. Despite the difficulty in quantifying the impact of selective reporting due to the lack of data from unpublished trials, the existing evidence suggests that it is, indeed, a relevant problem. 13 We propose a game of hard evidence (Milgrom (1981) When decision-makers are unsophisticated (because they lack the information required to draw precise inferences) there is no clear-cut recommendation to be made. The two alternative policies that are candidates to being optimal are laissez-faire and a compulsory registry complemented through a database. Which regime is optimal depends on how society values more trials (in laissez-faire) versus more precise information (with the intervention). We offer a deeper analysis of this trade-off and provide some qualified support for the latter. The reason is that the information gained relates to drugs society knows less about.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents our model of clinical trials.
Section 3 analyzes the laissez-faire scenario without policy, while Section 4 studies the implications of registries and results databases. Section 5 relaxes the assumptions concerning the information the decision-maker possesses and her degree of sophistication when drawing inference from it. The last section offers some concluding remarks.
6
We consider a pharmaceutical firm that produces a drug for a particular therapeutic market. Success in product market competition depends on the perceived 'quality' q of the company's product in the eyes of market participants. This perceived 'quality' refers to gross effectiveness and how this effectiveness is diminished as a result of side-effects, contraindications, interactions with other treatments, and the like.
Prior to the outcome of product market competition the firm can conduct a clinical trial in order to improve the position of the firm's product in the market by improving the perceived 'quality' q. For our model it does not matter whether we think of this trial as superiority, non-inferiority or equivalence trial and whether the point of comparison is an established therapy or a placebo. In all those cases a successful trial has the potential to increase the perceived 'quality' of the firm's product. However, in order to fix ideas we find it convenient to illustrate our model with the example of a firm designing a trial to show that its product is not worse than its competitors'.
A clinical trial can have three possible outcomes. First, the trial can show the equivalence of two approaches of treatment. We will refer to this outcome as a positive trial. Second, the trial can show that the firm's product is inferior, a situation to which we will refer as negative trial. Third, the trial can be inconclusive (see De Angelis et al. (2004)).
We model clinical trials as follows. There are two states of the world {0, 1} and we denote the true state of the world by ω. The interpretation is that in state 0, the firms drug is inferior, while in state 1 both treatments are equivalent. Initially, the probability that the firm's drug is equivalent is q > 0.
Thus, the perceived 'quality' q measures quality in the sense that it answers the question how likely it is that the firm's product lives up to its expectations.
The firm can conduct a clinical trial at a cost K > 0. The result of the clinical trial is denoted by t. The clinical trial reveals with probability x ∈ [0, 1] the true state of the world, that is, t = ω.
With probability 1 − x, the trial is inconclusive, that is, t = ∅. The information revealed through a trial is hard evidence. This captures the fact that a pharmaceutical firm cannot forge the entire evidence of clinical trials indicating that certain desirable treatment effects exist when they do not.
However, the scandals mentioned in the Introduction indicate that the firm can selectively report trial results. We denote the firm's report or message by M . If the trial reveals that the firm's drug has serious side-effects and is not equivalent to the competitors', that is t = 0, then the firm can hide this trial. Thus, if t = ω, the pharmaceutical firm can decide to publish the result of the test or not, i.e., M ∈ {ω, ∅}. If the trial is inconclusive, that is, t = ∅, then the pharmaceutical firm can not forge evidence and has to report this fact, that is, M = ∅. Although in reality there are many different medical decision-makers who use clinical trial results, for simplicity we postulate that there is just one representative medical decision-maker who receives the message.
To make the analysis interesting, unless otherwise stated, we focus on situations in which the perceived 'quality' of the firm is not maximal (q < 1) and trials can be successful (x > 0). The precise timing of this game is as follows:
The firm decides whether to conduct a clinical trial.
Stage 2:
A message M is sent to the medical decision-maker (if no trial has been conducted, M = ∅).
Stage 3:
The medical decision-maker updates her belief about the perceived 'quality' of the firm's product to q x .
Stage 4: Product market competition takes place.
This game is solved by backward induction. However, instead of solving one specific model for stage 4, we assume, in principle, any model in which the firm has an incentive to generate scientific knowledge:
Monotonicity Assumption: The equilibrium profits of the firm resulting from product market competition, denoted by EΠ(q), are strictly increasing in its perceived 'quality' q.
We argue now that this assumption is very mild. First, given that we aim at looking at how incentives to conduct clinical trials are affected through registries, supposing that profits depend on trial outcomes is the conservative assumption to make. Starting with a situation in which there are no incentives to conduct trials would obscure the picture. Second, increasingness of firms' profits on perceived quality is in line with the few existing empirical evidence available which comes from the antiulcer-drug market (Azoulay (2002)). 14 Finally, as we will see throughout the paper, an important element for the analysis will be the extent to which the market rewards a higher perceived 'quality'. The monotonicity assumption only requires that firms' profits are increasing in the quality, but does not impose any restriction on the shape of the profit function EΠ(q). For the sake of future reference we will say that the pharmaceutical firm enjoys increasing returns to quality whenever the marginal impact of an increase in the perceived 'quality' is increasing in q (i.e., if the profit function is increasing and convex in q). Conversely, we will say that the firm faces decreasing returns to quality if the marginal effect of an increase in the perceived 'quality' is decreasing (i.e., if the profit function is increasing and concave in q).
14 The function EΠ (q) that summarizes the outcome of product market competition has been kept sufficiently general so as to encompass different possibilities depending on the interpretation of our model. In particular, one can construct We study now the benchmark scenario for clinical trials, in which firms are completely unconstrained in their decision whether to conduct trials. We show that this leads to selective reporting.
Under laissez-faire, the medical decision-maker does not observe the pharmaceutical firm's decision whether to invest in clinical tests or not. As a result, she has to base her behavior on her beliefs about what the firm is doing. The appropriate equilibrium concept is, hence, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which both the decision-maker and the pharmaceutical firm behave optimally, given their beliefs about the other's action and these beliefs are, at equilibrium, correct. As usually, there might be multiple equilibria and we search first for a PBE in which clinical trials are conducted.
Notice first that, given that clinical trial results are hard evidence, if the firm reports low quality (t = 0), then the decision-maker infers q x = 0. Because of the monotonicity assumption, this message strategy is not a best reply. Consequently, the pharmaceutical firm only discloses information that favors its cause. Damaging evidence is hidden. Formally, selective reporting is as follows
A decision-maker expecting trials to take place updates beliefs as follows
That is to say, if the decision-maker receives no evidence, taking into account selective reporting, she expects that it is more likely that the product is of low quality (the true state is 0), since the pharmaceutical firm may have received this information and decided not to disclose it (a negative trial was conducted).
Given this, the expected profits of the firm from investing in a clinical trial are
With probability xq there will be a positive trial and the beliefs of the decision maker will be q x = 1.
However, in the remaining cases the trial will be negative or inconclusive and the perceived 'quality' diminishes to q x = q(1 − x)/(1 − xq). Profits when the firm does not invest in a trial are
The reason is that the firm is expected to invest and lack of positive trial results deteriorates the firm's position in the market. The pharmaceutical firm invests in the trial if and only if
Provided the above inequality holds, this corresponds to a PBE. We summarize this in the following result:
Proposition 1 Under laissez-faire, there exists a PBE in which the pharmaceutical firm performs a clinical trial provided trials are cheap enough, that is,
So we have seen that in a world without regulation, there will be clinical trials. We will now check when there exists a PBE in which the firm is correctly expected not to perform trials.
If a trial is conducted, reporting is selectively as before, formalized in (1). However, if the decisionmaker does not expect the firm to invest in a trial, then she will update her beliefs differently from (2)
That is to say, if no evidence is received, she will consider that no trial has been conducted and she will not update her beliefs. Expected profits from a trial are
and those from not performing the trial become
The pharmaceutical firm will not invest in the trial if and only if
Proposition 2 Under laissez-faire, there exists a PBE in which the pharmaceutical firm does not perform a clinical trial provided trials are expensive enough, that is,
It is straightforward to check that
two equilibria coexist and the beliefs of the decision-maker determine whether we have equilibrium with or without clinical trials. It will prove useful to underline at this point that when there exists no regulation the decision whether or not to invest in trials depends only on the costs of trials and the degree to which, following the monotonicity assumption, the firm's profits increase in its 'perceived'
quality. For later reference we summarize this as follows.
Corollary 1 Under laissez-faire, if trials are cheap enough in the unique PBE clinical trials are performed-independently of the conditions under which product market competition takes place.
The situation described in this subsection has shown how, in the absence of any policy, the performance of clinical trials is characterized by (i) a lack of observability of the trials that are actually performed and (ii) selective reporting of the test result by firms. These are the main reasons that have led to a demand for regulation. The analysis of the policies proposed is the subject of our concern in the next section. In what follows we analyze successively the main policies proposed. The premise for our analysis is that policymakers aim at minimizing the uncertainty about the efficacy and the therapeutic advances of new drugs. However, notice that this uncertainty is not only reduced when more is learned from a given clinical trial. It is also reduced when more trials are carried out. Therefore, throughout the paper, we will consider policies as more appealing, the more they stimulate honest reporting (i.e., transparency) and the performance of clinical trials. 15 and updates beliefs as in (2) . Expected payoffs are given by (3). However, assume the firm avoids registering although a trial is conducted. In case that it does not provide evidence from positive trials, the decision-maker infers that no trial has been conducted and updates beliefs as in (5) . Hence, the firm's profits are given by (6) . Thus, the firm has no incentive to register the trial.
Voluntary Registries of Clinical Trials
"
Proposition 3
Voluntary clinical trial registries have no effect. In particular, there does not exist a PBE in which the firm conducts only trials that have previously been registered. We analyze now compulsory registries.
Compulsory Registries of Clinical Trials
"One solution, some in Congress say, is a mandatory registry, in which all clinical trials must be registered at their inception"
With a compulsory registry in place the pharmaceutical firm cannot publish (disclose) evidence from a trial not registered in advance. The whole point of a registry is that, if the firm decides to invest in a trial, this decision becomes observable for the public. As a result, the behavior of the decision-maker is no longer based on her beliefs about what the firm is doing. The firm selectively reports as in (1), the decision-maker updates beliefs as in (2) when she observes investment in trials in the registry, and expected profits from conducting a trial become those in (3). However, if no investment in a trial is made by the firm, this is reflected in the registry. Thus, the decision-maker does not update beliefs and the firm's profits from not investing in the trial are given by (7) . The pharmaceutical firm invests in the trial if and only if the former is larger than the latter which is the same as
Summarizing, we have that the following holds.
Proposition 4
In the unique PBE with a compulsory clinical trial registry, the pharmaceutical firm conducts a clinical trial if trials are cheap enough, that is, K ≤ K CR ; and decides not to generate scientific knowledge otherwise.
This result says that when trials are cheap enough, a compulsory clinical trial registry can solve part of the problem: medical decisions are taken based on all trials conducted. However, the problem of selective reporting is still there. In addition, incentives for investment in trials are reduced. This is so because K CR < K LF No_t holds implying that both (i) the range of situations in which the firm conducts trials is more restrictive and (ii) the range of situations in which the firm does not conduct trials is larger than under laissez-faire. In this sense it is 'less likely' that the firm generates scientific knowledge. trials the firm compares profits of both possibilities. An important consequence of the compulsory registry is to make the firm's investment decision observable for the public. However, in a PBE with investment in trials, the firm is already expected to conduct trials. Moreover, the profits from not investing in trials increase as the registry increases the opportunity costs of conducting trials. The firm can now 'prove' that it is not conducting trials. Therefore, the lack of positive evidence is not penalized by the product market and not investing is more profitable. Thus, the incentives of the firm to conduct trials are reduced.
It is important to see that this deterrence effect can be substantial. Can there be situations in which clinical trials are completely deterred? Rewriting we obtain
Notice that this only holds if EΠ (q) exhibits increasing returns to quality. Otherwise, no trial is conducted (even if trials were costless). 16 The intuition for this complete deterrence effect is that the firm can now win when the trial is positive or lose when it is negative. As a result, investment in trials only happens when the firm is willing to take the risk of losing, which depends on the extent to which the conditions of product market competition reward higher quality. 17 Thus, contrary to the situation without regulation (Corollary 1), with a compulsory registry product market conditions matter for the firm's investment decision in clinical trials.
Corollary 2 A compulsory registry has the following effects:
(i) It always has a deterrence effect on the firm's incentives to conduct clinical trials.
(ii) A necessary condition for the firm to be willing to conduct clinical trials is that there are increasing returns to quality in product market competition.
The existing evidence on market performance seems to support the assumption of increasing returns to quality and, hence, the conclusion that the deterrence effect of registries will not be complete. In
fact, Grabowski et al. (2002) estimated a highly skewed distribution of returns (net present values)
for new drug introductions. According to their findings, the top decile of most successful new drugs accounted for a 52% of the total present value generated by all new drugs. 18 This seems to suggest that market rewards higher perceived quality at a highly increasing rate. 16 Clinical trial costs are substantial. One single trial may cost from $1 million to more than $50 million (Simes (2002)). Moreover, postmarketing trials are very likely to be expensive because often (although not always) they are conducted against active comparators and the differences are then likely to be smaller than between a drug and a placebo (Congressional Budget Office (2006))." 17 This parallels the findings in Dahm and Porteiro (2008) in a model of informational lobbying. 18 Moreover, this seems to be a steady pattern of behavior over time since a similar analysis conducted for the 1980-1990
A Compulsory Registry Complemented by Trial Results Databases
"Democrats plan to introduce legislation ... require that all clinical studies be described publicly at their inception and that results be added when a trial is complete"
Couzin (2004a).
In addition to clinical trial registries a second popular policy proposal concerns clinical trial results databases. Such a database contains (a summary of the) results of completed clinical studies, regardless of outcome. An important question is to identify which strategic effects the presence of databases can generate and whether the negative incentive effects of registries extend to the situation in which registries are complemented through databases.
Notice that if the database is sufficiently comprehensive, it introduces a mechanism that solves the problem of selective reporting so that once a clinical trial is conducted, the pharmaceutical firm, if it posts results in the database, has no choice but to reveal the result of the trial. Formally, instead of
(1), we have informative reporting,
Note also that assuming that the firm has no choice but to use the database is equivalent to imposing a regime of 'full transparency' by assumption. So we prefer to make the conservative assumption that the use of the database is a voluntary choice of the firm. Moreover, we assume that the firm does not have the capacity to credibly commit, ex-ante, that it will disclose its results to the database. In other words, this means that the decision to post information in the database is an ex-post choice of the firm, once it has observed the results of the clinical trial.
On the one hand, since there is a compulsory registry, the decision to conduct the trial is observable for the medical decision-maker who, therefore, does not have to base her behaviour on beliefs. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical firm has to decide, first, whether to conduct the trial or not and, if it conducts it, whether to disclose the results to the database or not. Let us start by solving this latter decision.
As the database is assumed to be sufficiently comprehensive, it is a mechanism that, if used, eliminates any 'ambiguity' in the report of the firm: If the firm fills in the database, this automatically implies that the outcome of the test is made public. What will the firm do? First if t = 1, the strategy to publicly disclose the results in the database is trivially optimal: t = 1 is the preferred state of the period (Grabowski and Vernon (1994)) also found a highly skewed distribution of returns. In this study, the top two deciles accounted for more than a 70% of the total net present value.
the results to the database: No matter what the beliefs of the decision-maker are, there is nothing worse than reporting that the trial proved the inferiority of the firm's drug. Finally, if t = ∅, by filling in the database, the firm can show that its trial truly failed and generated an inconclusive result. If the firm did not post its results in the database, the decision-maker might suspect that the firm is hiding a negative result and update her beliefs in detriment of the firm's interest. Hence, if t = ∅, the firm will report its results to the database.
The next step is to determine the behaviour of the decision-maker. If she observes that a trial has been registered, what will she infer about the use of the database? Consider a skeptical posture giving rise to the following beliefs: "I expect the firm to fill in the database if and only if t 6 = 0". This way the decision-maker can extract all the information even from the uninformative results. 19 It is worth noting that there cannot be an informative Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which less information is revealed. 20 This implies the following.
Corollary 3 A compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement a regime of 'full transparency'.
This combined policy, therefore, is successful in achieving full transparency. First, the compulsory registry makes the decision to undertake a test observable to the medical decision-maker and, secondly, the skepticism of the decision-maker towards the use of the database allows him to extract all the information from the test, irrespective of its outcome.
What is left to assess is how this enhanced transparency affects the incentives of the firm to actually invest in clinical trials. The profits of the firm from conducting a trial are given by
while, because of the registry, when no trial is conducted profits are given by (7) . Comparing yields that the former exceeds the latter if and only if
Proposition 5 When there is a compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary clinical trial results
database and trials are cheap enough, that is, K ≤ K F T , there exists a PBE in which:
(i) The firm conducts trials and reports the results to the database, except when the trial provides evidence against the firm's drug.
(ii) The medical decision-maker considers the non-disclosure of results to the database as a proof that the outcome of the trial was negative for the firm.
We have shown that 'full transparency' can be achieved through this combined policy. However, an important question is whether this increases or decreases the incentives to conduct clinical trials relative to the laissez-faire scenario. It is straightforward to check that K F T < K LF No_t . This implies that-as in the situation of a compulsory registry without database-under 'full transparency' both (i) the range of situations in which the firm conducts trials is more restrictive and (ii) the range of situations in which the firm does not conduct trials is larger than under laissez-faire. Again, it is 'less likely' that the firm generates scientific knowledge. Moreover, it can also be the case that tests are fully deterred. This will not happen, provided
Notice that this only holds if EΠ (q) exhibits increasing returns to quality. Otherwise, no trial is conducted (even if trials were costless). 21 Summarizing, we have the following.
Corollary 4 A compulsory registry complemented by a voluntary clinical trial results database has the following effects:
(i) It can implement a regime of 'full transparency'.
(ii) It always has a deterrence effect on the firm's incentives to conduct clinical trials.
(iii) A necessary condition for the firm to be willing to conduct clinical trials is that there are increasing returns to quality in product market competition.
This subsection has highlighted an implication of a regime of 'full transparency' that the discussion on policies to regulate clinical trials has neglected so far: There exists a trade-off between transparency 21 The deterrence effect of the combined policy is, therefore, similar to that of a compulsory registry alone. However, it can be shown that K F T > K CR , whenever K F T and K CR are strictly positive. That is, whenever the deterrence effect is not complete, it is stronger under a compulsory clinical trial registry than under the policy that combines the registry with a results database. Suppose this policy is implemented. On the one hand, since there is no registry, the decision to conduct the trial is not observable for the medical decision-maker who, therefore, has to base her behavior on beliefs. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical firm has to decide, first, whether to conduct the trial or not and, if it conducts it, whether to disclose the results to the database or not.
Concerning this latter decision the same reasoning as in the last subsection applies and the firm reports the results to the database when t ∈ {∅, 1} and hides evidence for t = 0.
The next step is to determine the behaviour of the decision-maker. If she expects the firm to conduct the trial, what will she infer about the use of the database? Consider a skeptical posture generating the following beliefs: "I expect the firm to conduct a trial and to fill in the database if and only if t 6 = 0". This way the decision-maker can extract all the information even from the uninformative results. Again, it can be shown that there cannot be an informative Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which less information is revealed.
Given this posture by the medical decision-maker, the profits of the firm from conducting a trial are given by (10), while when not conducting the trial profits are:
Not conducting the trial is very expensive, as the decision-maker will be convinced that the firm not only conducted a trial, but also obtained a negative result. Comparing these expressions we have that the pharmaceutical firm will invest in the trial if and only if EΠ t − EΠ No_t > 0
Given the monotonicity assumption, it is direct that K V D t > 0. Finally, it is straightforward that this system of beliefs and actions forms a PBE. We have, thus, the following result.
Proposition 6
When there is a voluntary clinical trial results database without registry and trials are cheap enough, that is, K < K V D t , there exists a PBE in which:
(ii) The medical decision-maker expects the firm to conduct the trial and considers the non-disclosure of results to the database as a proof that the outcome of the trial was negative for the firm.
We see how the presence of a voluntary results database has very important implications for the informative equilibrium. The firm uses the database to give credibility to its message that the trial failed and reached inconclusive results. Far from being an advantage for the firm, this triggers a skeptical response from the decision-maker that turns out to be a very powerful information-acquisition tool. The decision-maker, since she knows that the firm has the capacity to give full credibility to its messages, can safely infer that, if the firm has not used this mechanism, it must be because it has a message it does not want to reveal: the outcome of the trial was conclusive and against the firm's interests. This way the decision-maker can, at equilibrium, obtain all the information from the firm and eliminate the problem of selective reporting.
We have shown how the presence of a database substantially improves the decision-maker's capacity to extract information from the firm's clinical trials. But is that achieved at the expense of deterring the firm from investing in clinical trials? Not at all. If we compare the threshold of the costs that determines the existence of an informative equilibrium in the laissez-faire scenario (K LF t ) with
The voluntary results database enlarges the set of parameters compatible with an equilibrium in which the firm invests in clinical trials. In this setting the skepticism on the part of the decision-maker decreases the opportunity cost of conducting trials, since the absence of any disclosure by the firm is understood as an evidence that it is withholding unwanted information.
As a result, the firm is more eager to conduct a trial. We summarize this as follows. Notice that this policy is optimal in the sense that given 'full transparency', trials are stimulated as much as possible: 'Full transparency' fixes unambiguously the gains from a trial, while the opportunity costs of a trial (given by (11) ) are reduced as much as possible.
Of course, as usual in these settings, there exists also a non-informative equilibrium in which the decision-maker optimally expects the firm not to perform a trial (and, hence, not to fill in the database).
It is straightforward to check that this equilibrium is fully analogous to the one in Proposition 2 and that there is a range of parameter values for which there is multiplicity of equilibria (as K LF No_t < K V D t holds). The analysis of Section 4 predicts that the decision-maker anticipates the firm's investment decision in trials and bases her decision both on published studies and on the lack of publicly available evidence in the case the trial was not positive (e.g. Proposition 1). In other words, decision-makers understand that firms might be withholding relevant information. This might be a reasonable assumption when the decision-maker is a committee conducting a systematic search of all the evidence regarding a drug, for example, in order to make a coverage decision for a health care plan or professional societies drafting practice guidelines. From a formal point of view, the analysis has made strong assumptions concerning the information the decision-maker possesses and her degree of sophistication when drawing inference from it. 22 However, the discussion concerning regulation suggests that the existence of trials that remain unpublished is often not appropriately taken into account. This problem is particularly relevant if we consider as decision-makers, for instance, practicing clinicians who make the ultimate 22 Notice that in order to form 'correct beliefs' the decision-maker needs to know for each pharmaceutical product the perceived 'quality' q, how the firm's profits depend on this perceived 'quality' EΠ (q) and the 'quality' x of the trial.
Only in that case, she will be able to form the correct expectations about the incentives of the firms to actually conduct trials.
prescribing decisions and who may have a more limited access to information. We investigate now the implications of situations where the decision-maker is ill-informed or does not have the capacity to draw the correct inference.
For this purpose, we model the decision-maker as a "naive" player in the game that does not form any expectation concerning whether a trial is carried out or not. However, if hard evidence concerning the perceived 'quality' q of the firm's product is revealed, the decision-maker's beliefs are updated accordingly (i.e., as in (5)). Moreover, if the decision-maker is certain that a trial has been conducted, she is rational, in the sense that she can update her beliefs as in (2) . We offer next an informal discussion of what implications this has for our analysis. We indicate the corresponding thresholds bŷ K instead of K as in the previous sections.
First, under laissez-faire, given selective reporting (1), the decision-maker retains the prior belief unless a positive trial is revealed. Thus, (6) is compared to (7) . This implies that in (the now unique) equilibrium trials are conducted if and only if trials are cheap enough, that is, K ≤K LF ≡ K LF No_t . Second, the conclusions concerning registries are robust: Since once a trial is registered the decisionmaker is able to draw the appropriate inference, voluntary registries will not be used. Under compulsory registries, trials are conducted if and only if trials are cheap enough, that is,
Moreover, when compulsory registries are complemented through a database the performance of tests can be observed and, hence, the decision-maker is able to have a skeptical posture. Thus, a regime of 'full transparency' can be implemented for K ≤K F T ≡ K F T and the conclusion that 'full transparency' has a deterrence effect on clinical trials is still true.
Third, without a compulsory registry the decision-maker is unable to sustain a posture of sophisticated skepticism. As a result, a voluntary results database without a compulsory registry does not allow to extract the relevant information. If no trial is conducted, (by assumption) the decision-maker is not capable of forming expectations that a trial was conducted and the firm's payoffs are given by (7) . This implies that the firm has no need to reveal inconclusive trials and payoffs from conducting a trial are given by (6) . Consequently, the laissez-faire equilibrium is not affected by the creation of a voluntary results database. We formalize now this basic trade-off. Proposition 8 shows that in the absence of any intervention, the incentives of the firms to conduct trials are higher but, with the combined policy the decisionmakers obtain more information from the trials that are actually performed. We offer then an analysis of the type of trials involved in the trade-off which lends some qualified support for the popular demand for intervention.
In order to formalize the trade-off, notice that under laissez-faire, trials are conducted if and only if K <K LF . In this case, the information acquired by the decision-makers is: (i) If the test is conducted and t = 1, then q x = 1 (i.e., if the test reveals the favorable state for the firm, the decision-makers will learn it); (ii) in any other situation q x = q (no information is acquired).
In the scenario in which a compulsory registry is complemented through a voluntary database, clinical trials are carried out if and only if K ≤K F T . 23 Here the information acquired by the decisionmakers is: (i) If the test is conducted and t = 1, then q x = 1 (again, if the test reveals the favorable state for the firm, the decision-makers will learn it); (ii) if the test is conducted and t = 0, then q x = 0 (i.e., the decision-makers also learn when the test revealed that the true state is unfavorable to the firm); (iii) both if the test is conducted and t = ∅, and if the test is not carried out, then q x = q (no information is acquired).
In order to illustrate better how these two policies compare, we need to define the value that information has for society. Let us define by SV (q x |ω) the value of assigning a probability q x to state 1, conditional on ω being the true state. To be consistent with our previous analysis we stick solely to the assumption that the less uncertainty the better. This only requests that SV (q x = 1|ω = 1) and SV (q x = 0|ω = 0) are always higher than SV (q x = q|ω = 1) and SV (q x = q|ω = 0) respectively.
Denoting by ∆ the difference between the social value with the combined policy and in laissez-faire, the following trade-off emerges.
Proposition 8 The most efficient scenario is:
(i) Complementing compulsory registries through results databases, if K ≤K F T , formally
23 Throughout this section we consider that there are increasing returns to quality in the product market (i.e., that
, so that the combined policy does not fully deter clinical trials. As we already pointed out in Subsection 4.2, the existing empirical evidence (Grabowski et al. (2002) ) seems to support this assumption as the one that fits best the real data on drug market performance. That is, the relationship between profits from product market competition and perceived 'quality'
(measured by EΠ(q)), the 'quality' of the trials conducted (measured by x) and the cost of a single trial (K) are the same for all firms. However, pharmaceutical firms differ in the products they want to test. Some firms, for instance, may consider the possibility of conducting further trials on a product with a good position in the market (given by a high perceived 'quality' q), while other firms may be interested in pharmaceuticals with a weaker position. This heterogeneity can be very naturally embedded in the model by assuming that firms differ in the ex-ante perceived 'quality' of their drugs (q). The higher is q, the better the ex-ante position of the drug in the market. Notice that a very low or a very high q, also reflects a lower uncertainty about the drug's true quality.
Consider a continuum of firms each of which has to decide whether to invest in a clinical trial to assess the true quality of its product, or not. Firms differ in the value of q that is distributed according to a continuous density function F (q) in (0, 1). All firms have access to the same clinicaltrials technology, determined by a pair (x, K) that defines the quality of the test and its cost. Finally, in order to make the comparison meaningful, we assume that the combined policy does not fully deter all firms from conducting trials. Formally, this amounts to assuming that µ max qK F T ¶ > K.
In this setting it can be shown that:
Corollary 6 There exist a series of thresholds, 0 < q 1 < q 2 < q 3 < q 4 < 1, such that:
(i) Firms with q ∈ (q 2 , q 3 ] invest in clinical trials both with compulsory registries complemented through a voluntary database and laissez-faire.
(ii) Firms with q ∈ [q 1 , q 2 ) or q ∈ (q 3 , q 4 ] only invest in clinical trials in laissez-faire.
(iii) Firms with q < q 1 or q > q 4 never invest in clinical trials.
Proof. See the Appendix.
[Insert Figure 1 ] The optimal resolution of the trade-off depends, hence, on when society values additional information most. In our view, the present analysis lends important but qualified support for compulsory registries complemented through a voluntary database. This policy deters clinical trials of firms with drugs there is less uncertainty about (q is either high or low). However, society is likely to value this loss of information less than the gain of additional information about pharmaceuticals with important uncertainty (i.e., those for which the ex-ante value of q is intermediate).
This corollary can also be of interest regarding a highly controversial type of postmarketing research, the so-called "seeding trials". These trials are designed by the industry more with the aim of influencing physicians prescribing patterns rather than for scientific purposes. If we identify seeding trials as studies where firms have very little or no uncertainty about their final outcome, then the results of the Corollary 6 predict that registries will impose a strong deterrence effect on seeding trials. In this respect, therefore, our model provides unambiguous support for compulsory registries complemented through databases as a mechanism to fight such behaviour.
Building on Figure 1 one can easily identify other factors that will favour the combined policy vis-a-vis the laissez-faire:
• an improvement of the clinical-trials technology (i.e., a decrease in K and/or an increase in x), as this reduces the impact of the deterrence effect caused by the policy;
• an increase in the overall uncertainty faced by firms (i.e., an increase in the mass of firms with intermediate levels of q), as this reduces the number of firms deterred by the policy from investing in trials;
• an increase of the value society assigns to the information that a drug is worse than expected, relative to the value of knowing that it is better than expected, as this increases the informational surplus obtained from the policy.
Concluding Remarks
The present paper has offered a framework to analyze the incentives of drug companies to generate Our analysis has assumed the best case for a clinical trial results database: there is some mechanism that solves the problem of selective reporting so that the firm, if it decides to post results in the database, must report informatively. However, since the information submitted to databases is limited, it might not be sufficient in order to check whether a given trial reported to be inconclusive is negative or inconclusive. 24 When informative reporting cannot be implemented, then databases are just another 24 Results posting in databases conflicts with publication in peer reviewed journals. The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors will consider for publication results previously published if the posting contains less than 500
words (Laine et al. (2007) ).
'channel' through which firms can report selectively. 25 In this case the results on registries are not affected by the creation of results databases. This implies that policy-makers have two policies that are candidates to be optimal: on one hand, the laissez-faire scenario and, on the other, a compulsory registry. With well informed and/or sophisticated enough medical decision-makers the laissez-faire scenario is unambiguously better, as more trials are conducted and the same information is revealed.
When decision-makers are unsophisticated the following trade-off emerges between both alternatives.
Under laissez-faire, there are more trials conducted but with a compulsory registry decision-makers know about the existence of trials and that some information might be hold back. However, in this scenario the case for intervention is weaker than with reliable databases, as more trials are deterred and from those trials that are conducted less is learned.
Our analysis has also assumed the best case for clinical trial registries. However, there is evidence that compliance to registries is an issue (see Zarin et al. (2005) or Sekeres et al. (2008)). If decisionmakers have no access to registries or entries are not informative, then the results of the laissez-faire scenario are not altered through the introduction of registries. Thus, making sure compliance with registries and assuring access to them is a prerequisite for a meaningful public discussion on the effects of registries. 26 Although our model is designed to capture a pharmaceutical firm's investment in clinical trials, it seems to capture (at least) some recent developments in the biotech industry, too. Recently, the United
States National Human Genome Research Institute has found that genes do not act independently but that there appear to be network effects. As a result, the safety of biotech products has been questioned. According to experts, many biotech companies already conduct detailed genetic studies of their products but do not report their findings to regulators. Consequently, reporting requirements are discussed (see Caruso (2007) ).
Our analysis has also implications for a recent proposal to redesign the way clinical trials are conducted. Lewis et al. (2007) propose public funding and public oversight of clinical trials in order to do justice to the public good character of trials and assure that results are fully disclosed (see also Avorn (2006) ). Given that their proposal breaks the link between drug companies and researchers conducting the trials, in the language of the present paper 'full transparency' would be implemented.
We have shown that this can be expected to profoundly change the incentives to conduct trials. As in Lewis et al.'s proposal, "drug companies should continue to bear a significant portion of clinical trial costs" (p. 3), the deterrence effect identified in Subsection 4.3 applies and underlines the importance of the condition under which product market competition takes place for investment in clinical trials. 25 In this respect it is crucial how compliance is assured. Proposals include voluntary compliance, monetary penalties or public notification of noncompliance (Committee on Clinical Trial Registries (2006)). 26 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this important issue and providing us with the references cited.
We identify, thus, a force going in the opposite direction of their prediction that the shift from a privately-supplied public good to a publicly-supplied one will correct the underprovision of clinical trials.
There are further important issues related to clinical trial registries which cannot be analyzed within the framework of the simple model of the present paper. One such issue concerns the quality of the clinical trial (denoted by x). The present paper treats this as exogenous, although it seems reasonable that the firm determines (within certain limits) the probability that the trial is inconclusive.
From the perspective of the firm there will be an optimal level depending among other things on the institutional framework. Thus, it is likely that registries and databases affect this optimal choice of the firm. Consequently, the policy choice might determine how often trials are conclusive. We leave this interesting question for further research.
A second issue is related to disclosure timing. There is an important concern that the creation of a trial registry has the potential to jeopardize the commercial competitive advantage of pharmaceutical firms. As a result, the permission to delay disclosure of sensitive information has been discussed.
However, it is not clear whether disclosure threatens or promotes innovation (see Palmisano (2005) ).
It is, hence, a challenging future research question to offer guidelines on this topic.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 8
In order to compare the two policies, we compute the expected social welfare SV e under each. Under laissez-faire we have that:
• If K ≤K LF : Analogously, for the scenario with registries and databases we have that:
SV
• If K ≤K F T : • If K >K F T :
SV e F T = Pr (w = 1) SV (q x = q|ω = 1) + Pr (w = 0) SV (q x = q|ω = 0) .
Defining ∆ ≡ SV e F T − SV e LF and simplification of the resulting expressions yields the statement.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 6
It is straightforward to see thatK F T <K LF . Moreover, it can be checked that: Then, since ³ max qK F T´> K, this necessarily implies that EΠ (·) is a convex function in q x since, otherwise,K F T < 0. This can be used to check that, bothK F T andK LF are concave functions in q.
All these facts together imply that there exist a quadruple (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 ) with 0 < q 1 < q 2 < q 3 < q 4 < 1 such that:
